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A Powerful Mandate: NEPA and State
Environmental Review Acts in the
Courts
Philip Weinberg*
Recent court decisions construing the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)1 and the state laws which are com-
panions to New York's State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA) 2 furnish a chiaroscuro sketch for the practi-
tioner - some advances for environmental protection, some
retreats. In some of the most significant cases, described in
this article, the courts have been vigilant in insisting on com-
pliance with environmental quality review laws, halting major
projects when they found contraventions of the statutes.
These decisions, however, must be weighed against others
which show reluctance to implement these laws and timidity
in their judicial enforcement.
First, this article will discuss several salient decisions in-
terpreting NEPA in recent years.3 It then will analyze the
most meaningful recent decisions and statutory amendments
in the states with laws similar to SEQRA."
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; A.B., University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., Columbia Law School. Professor Weinberg headed the New York
State Attorney General's Environmental Protection Bureau from 1970-78. He is the
author of a casebook on environmental law, Environmental Law: Cases and Materials
(1985), and of the Practice Commentaries to McKinney's New York Environmental
Conservation Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
3. For earlier background, see Orloff, SEQRA: New York's Reformation of
NEPA, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1128 (1982), and the articles cited therein, discussing NEPA
litigation up to 1982.
4. Pre-1982 statutes and decisions are ably analyzed in Robinson, SEQRA's Sib-
lings: Precedents from Little NEPA's in the Sister States, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1155
(1982).
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I. Recent NEPA Decisions
In recent years, the federal courts, in construing NEPA, have
amply shown that failure to satisfy NEPA's mandate will
jeopardize the most immense of projects. The litigation halt-
ing New York's Westway dramatized this fact, and signaled
that environmental quality review is a weapon to be taken
seriously.
Westway seemed a juggernaut, impossible to stop. The
proposed interstate highway along Manhattan's west side, ac-
companied by a landfill to be used for real estate development
and a riverside park, had received its required air quality per-
mit under the Clean Air Act,' and its permit to place fill in
the Hudson River under the Clean Water Act, section 404.
The United States District Court upheld the air permit and
rebuffed a challenge to the environmental impact statement
for failure to consider alternatives. 7 The dredge-and-fill per-
mit, however, was enjoined because the Army Corps of Engi-
neers failed both to adequately consider the impact of the
proposed filling on the fish resources of the Hudson, particu-
larly the economically important striped bass, and to disclose
this impact in its environmental impact statement (EIS).8
Following this decision, the plaintiffs amended their com-
plaint to name the Federal Highway Administration. The
court heard additional proof and confirmed its original injunc-
tion, finding that the Corps contravened both NEPA and the
Clean Water Act in issuing the permit.9 The court of appeals,
affirming the district court, found "amply supported by the
record" its finding that the EIS "contained false statements
depicting the interpier region as 'biologically impoverished'
and as a 'biological wasteland,' when, in fact, the interpier
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The highway needed and
received an indirect source permit under the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7410(a)(5).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
7. Action for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
8. Id.
9. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1367
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
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area in winter harbored a concentration of juvenile striped
bass." a
It further noted that the Corps, although it purported to
respond to critical comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, had failed to perform new studies or
collect new data." Describing the Corps' approach as "cava-
lier," 2 the court upheld the injunction "unless and until the
[Federal Highway Administration] and the Corps reconsider
the matter of impact on fisheries in accordance with NEPA
and the Clean Water Act."1"
The Corps prepared a supplemental EIS (SEIS) in which,
as in its earlier EIS and other documents, it characterized
Westway as primarily a transportation project, with attendant
real estate development benefits. But the Corps' District En-
gineer, in granting the landfill permit anew, candidly stated
that Westway "is better termed a 'redevelopment' project"
and that "if [he] had characterized Westway as a highway
project, he could not have granted the landfill permit."" Since
the raisons d'etre for this huge project were so blatantly mis-
stated in the EIS and in the decision granting the permit, Dis-
trict Judge Thomas F. Griesa found the EIS wanting, and
again enjoined the project. 5 The court noted:
Not only should this characterization of the project have
been disclosed to the public in the SEIS, but the discus-
sion of alternatives to Westway was required to be stated
in terms of redevelopment. The choice among alternatives
was basically the choice between real estate and park de-
velopment through the Westway landfill project, recogniz-
ing that Westway is not needed for transportation pur-
poses, and other types and degrees of development
10. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d
Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 1030-31.
12. Id. at 1031.
13. Id. at 1049.
14. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 614 F. Supp. 1475, 1479,
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 772 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. Id. at 1517.
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without Westway. An analysis of this kind would inevita-
bly have included a thorough discussion of potential pri-
vate development, undoubtedly on a lesser scale than
Westway, but at a lesser cost both in money and in effects
on the environment, and without the expenditure of pub-
lic funds. This analysis would have focused on the real
issue the decision makers had to deal with.
The SEIS in the present case largely avoided this is-
sue and was thus materially deficient. The requirements
of NEPA and the 1982 judgments of this court have not
been complied with. 6
Similarly, the Corps' Draft Supplemental EIS found that the
landfill would significantly affect the striped bass habitat of
the Hudson, but the final statement described that impact as
"minor and inconsequential." 7 The judge found the Corps'
view that "there was no change in its basic conclusion as to
impact" to be "incredible. 8
Affirming the district court once again in this respect, the
court of appeals held: "A change in something from yesterday
to today creates doubt. When the anticipated explanation is
not given, doubt turns to disbelief. This case is capsulized in
that solitary simile."'19
Although the court of appeals set aside the lower court's
injunction permanently barring the Corps from issuing a per-
mit, it upheld its finding that the shift from the "significant
adverse impact" foretold in the Draft Supplemental EIS to
the rosy view expressed in the final statement was "a post-hoc
rationalization unworthy of belief."20
It therefore affirmed the judgment vacating the permit -
sounding the death-knell of the project, as it proved. Shortly
after the decision of the court of appeals,. New York traded in
16. Id. at 1479-80.
17. Id. at 1480.
18. Id.
19. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d
Cir. 1985).
20. Id. at 1055. Judge Mansfield dissented as to this issue and would have af-
firmed the injunction as well.
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4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/1
NEPA AND STATE REVIEW ACTS
Westway 1 in favor of federal funding for a less prodigious
road coupled with hundreds of millions in capital improve-
ments for the City's mass transit system. 22 The NEPA pro-
cess, rigorously insisted on by the courts, proved to be the
Achilles' heel of a fatally flawed, but seemingly inexorable
proposal.
NEPA's obligation that federal agencies consider alterna-
tives to a project, as well as whether or not the proposal re-
quires an EIS, has been examined in another major decision,
City of New York v. United States Department of Transpor-
tation.23 NEPA section 102(2)(E)24 requires agencies to
"study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to rec-
ommended courses of action in any proposal which involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available
resources." This obligation is broader than the requirement
that federal agencies prepare environmental impact state-
ments before undertaking "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.
'2 5
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,2"
the leading precedent on the ambit of the need to consider
alternatives, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that such alternatives to an offshore oil-leasing
program as increased imports, and available alternate re-
sources of energy such as natural gas and nuclear power,
should be considered. 7 The court held that "[t]he mere fact
that an alternative requires legislative implementation does
not automatically establish it as beyond the domain of what is
required for discussion. "28
21. 16 Env't. Rep. Current Dev. (BNA) 902 (Sept. 20, 1985).
22. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1987, at B3, col. 1.
23. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-36
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
26. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
27. Id. The case dealt with the discussion of alternatives in an EIS prepared by
the Department of the Interior.
28. Id. at 837. But see, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524
F.2d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 1975)(holding that agencies need not consider "alternatives which
could only be implemented after significant changes in governmental policy or
19871
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City of New York v. DOT,29 expressing disagreement with
NRDC v. Morton, severely limited the need to discuss alterna-
tives. The litigation stemmed from the agency's promulgation
of rules to govern the shipment of large quantities of radioac-
tive materials by road. The regulation at issue allows ship-
ment on interstate highways, including those traversing the
City of New York.80 The city, whose local law barring such
shipments was presumptively preempted by the federal regu-
lation,31 applied to the Department of Transportation (De-
partment or DOT) for a "non-preemption ruling" - in effect,
a dispensation from the federal regulation's otherwise pre-
emptive effect.32 While this application was pending, the city
sued, together with the state, contending inter alia that the
Department neglected to consider alternatives such as barging
nuclear materials instead of shipping them by truck.33
The court, reversing the district judge, narrowed the view
expressed in NRDC v. Morton, holding that only those alter-
natives need be weighed which lie within the statutory objec-
tives of the action proposed. 3' It observed that the agency's
finding of no significant impact, allowing it to dispense with
legislation").
29. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984).
30. 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-73, 177 (1987). The regulations mandate use of a beltway
around a city when available, id. § 177.825(b), but none exists around the City of New
York.
31. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act § 112(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1982).
32. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 739 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). The city's request to be exempted from
federal preemption was subsequently denied by the Department of Transportation,
and the city has commenced new litigation to annul that denial. City of New York v.
United States Dep't of Transp., No. 87 Civ. 1443 (S.D.N.Y.). The state of Connecticut
and a number of utility companies have intervened in that action as defendants, and
motions by both sides for summary judgment are pending before Judge Cedarbaum.
Interviews with Barry Schwartz, Assistant Counsel, Department of Environmental
Protection, City of New York (Nov. 6, 1985 and Feb. 29, 1988).
In addition, legislation was introduced to reverse the presumption in the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act that local laws are preempted. This bill would place
the burden on the Secretary of Transportation to overturn a local law such as New
York's. See H.R. 1146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. introduced in 1985 by Rep. Weiss. This
bill did not pass.
33. City of New Yorh, 715 F.2d at 741.
34. Id. at 743.
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an EIS, permits it "to consider a narrower range of alterna-
tives than it might be obliged to assess before undertaking ac-
tion that would significantly affect the environment."" Since
the regulation dealt only with highway shipment, the court
held that the Department need not consider barging as a na-
tionwide alternative. 6 Further, the court noted, barging could
be weighed in the context of the city's request for a non-pre-
emption ruling. 7 It also rejected the consideration of barging
around New York as irrelevant to a nationwide consideration
of alternatives. 8
This constricted view of the hitherto weighty mandate
that agencies consider alternatives amounts to a shell game. It
renders all but illusory a major purpose of considering alter-
natives: to compel agencies to focus their attention on reason-
ably available substitutes for the action proposed, such as
barging around New York instead of trucking nuclear materi-
als through densely populated urban areas.
The Second Circuit went on to rule that no EIS was re-
quired since the rule did not significantly affect the environ-
ment. 9 This issue led the court into the thicket of risk assess-
ment: weighing the likelihood of a highway accident involving
nuclear materials as well as its likely consequences. The DOT
had relied on a worst-case analysis prepared by a consultant
who concluded that the most lethal credible accident could
cause 1800 cancer deaths, but that the probability of such an
occurrence was so low - once every three hundred million
years, according to the consultant - that it did "not contrib-
ute significantly to expected values of risk."40
The district court had set aside the Department's envi-
ronmental assessment for failing to adequately discuss scien-
35. Id. at 744.
36. The court pointed out that twenty-six percent of the country's nuclear facili-
ties are not directly accessible to navigable waters. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 744,
n.12. But that means the remaining seventy-four percent are, and even the minority
could have nuclear materials brought by barge to or from the nearest port instead of
being trucked across the country.
37. Id. at 744. See supra note 32.
38. Id. at 744.
39. Id. at 745.
40. Id. at 747.
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tific disputes as to the projected numbers of shipments, the
reliability of containers, and the risks of sabotage and terror-
ism. Reversing, the court of appeals held the agency should be
granted broad latitude in determining how seriously to take
such factors.4 It is difficult to argue with that platitude, but
its application here undermines the purpose of NEPA to in-
sure that the agency honestly weighs those risks, instead of
blandly rubber-stamping the predictable views of its
consultants. 2
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the district judge's
view that "a proposal entailing a credible risk of catastrophe
demands treatment as one 'significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.' "" In this, the crux of its deci-
sion, the appeals court concluded that the remote possibility
of even a catastrophic risk, as a matter of law, does not consti-
tute a significant impact triggering an EIS." With risk assess-
ment as problematic as it is, and as fraught with uncertainty
and exercises of subjective judgment, this conclusion tears at
the fabric of NEPA.'5
41. Id. at 748-51.
42. Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), in which the same
court held, half a decade before NEPA:
[Tihe Commission has claimed to be the representative of the public inter-
est.This role does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and
strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must re-
ceive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.
The courts have cautioned against federal agencies "reflexively rubberstamping"
the impact statements of their consultants. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 59 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Sierra Club v. Hills, 421 U.S. 994, cert. denied sub
nom. Edwards Underground Water District v. Hills, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975). See also
Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed infra note 50. "[Plrivate
consultants play an important, if sometimes troubling, role in modern government.
See, e.g., D. Guttman & B. Willner, The Shadow Government (1976)." Sierra Club,
695 F.2d at 963 n.3.
43. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237, 1274
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984).
44. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 752 n.20.
45. In related contexts, the courts have adopted views more protective of the
public health. See Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 25
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976): "the statutes - and common
sense - demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than
certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol5/iss1/1
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Dissenting, Circuit Judge Oakes found the DOT's quanti-
fications of risks "absurd on their face.""6 He noted that the
agency was bound by the guidelines of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ) implementing NEPA, which man-
date that federal agencies weigh, in deciding whether action is
likely to "significantly affect" the environment, "[t]he degree
to which the possible effects on the human environment are
highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks." '48 Judge
Oakes pointed out that, in fact, the report on which the De-
partment acted omitted human errors resulting in vehicular
accidents (as opposed to errors leading directly to nuclear in-
cidents). The report candidly admitted that the data on these
two types of error were "vastly different.""9
The Fifth Circuit reached a quite different result the
same year in examining an agency's worst-case analysis in Si-
erra Club v. Sigler.50 The litigation challenged the Army
Corps of Engineers' issuance of permits to build a deepwater
port in Galveston Bay, allowing supertankers to supply oil to
the refineries abounding in the Houston-Texas City area.
Here, unlike the City of New York case, the Corps prepared
an EIS. But it failed to perform a worst-case analysis of a su-
pertanker spill resulting in a total loss of its cargo.
Noting that the CEQ's worst-case regulation codified a ju-
dicially created "'common law' of NEPA,"'I the court held
"the Sierra Club's catastrophic worst case is precisely what
the CEQ intended: 'to alert the public... to all known possi-
ble environmental consequences of agency action.' "52 The
Corps, it ruled, must consider the impact of a total cargo loss
by a supertanker in the bay despite its unlikelihood. As Cir-
46. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 753.
47. 40 C.F.R. § 1500-08 (1987).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1987).
49. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 757.
50. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 969-70. The court cited Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390 (1976), and other pivotal NEPA cases. Id. at 970.
52. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 972 (emphasis in original)(citing, CEQ's NEPA Regula-
tions, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032), (1981)).
1987]
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cuit Judge Oakes, dissenting in City of New York v. DOT,5"
aptly pointed out:
"Worst-case" accidents have a way of occurring - from
Texas City to the Hyatt Regency at Kansas City, from
the Tacoma Bridge to the Greenwich, Connecticut, 1-95
bridge, from the Beverly Hills in Southgate, Kentucky, to
the Coconut Grove in Boston, Massachusetts, and from
the Titanic to the DC-10 at Chicago."4
The CEQ amended its worst-case analysis requirement
shortly after these cases were decided. The rule now requires
discussion of "reasonably foreseeable significant adverse im-
pacts," defining "reasonably foreseeable" to include "impacts
which have catastrophic consequences, even if their prob-
ability ... is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is
supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure
conjecture, and is within the rule of reason."55 Thus the re-
quirement of worst-case analysis continues so long as credible
scientific evidence of the impact exists.
II. Recent State Law Developments
The six years since the Albany Law Review Symposium
on SEQRA 51 have witnessed both case-law development and
changes in the statutes of New York's sister states - prece-
dents from which New York attorneys can learn. The observa-
tion that NEPA's broad, constitution-like phrases have gener-
53. See supra notes 46-49.
54. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 753. See also Weinberg, Cargo of Fire: A Call
for Stricter Regulation of Liquefied Natural Gas Shipment and Storage, 4 Fordham
Urban L.J. 495, 514 (1975-76), describing the catastrophic Halifax harbor fire of 1917
as "prov[ing] beyond dispute that human fallibility can cause the most frightening
consequences despite what appears to be a surfeit of precautions."
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987)(as amended 1986). For a view that worst-case
analysis survives this amendment and is alive and well, see Note, The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act and the Revised CEQ Regulations: A Fate Worse than the
"Worst Case Analysis?", 60 St. John's L. Rev. 500 (1986). See also Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987) (worst case analysis still
required).
56. 46 Albany L. Rev. 1097 (1982).
[Vol. 5
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ated a federal "common law of NEPA"'7 applies equally to
the state acts which stem from the federal statute. As noted in
the Albany Symposium, 8 most of the fifteen state environ-
mental quality review acts were derived from NEPA5" and
track it with varying degrees of closeness. The past six years
have shown that these states take environmental review seri-
ously and do not hesitate to halt projects which contravene
their statutes. At the same time some recent amendments and
court decisions evince a narrowing of the statutes' scope -
sometimes a salutary streamlining, sometimes a blunting of
the laws' effectiveness.
This part of the article will examine recent cases and
statutory amendments relating to the state statutes' coverage,
the need for an EIS, EIS procedure, requirements for mitiga-
tion and consideration of alternatives, and judicial review of
administrative actions.
A. Coverage
Three states recently amended their statutes to broaden or re-
duce their applicability in important regards. California,
whose Environmental Quality Act 0 is the single most impor-
tant such state law outside New York, amended the Act in
1984 to expressly provide "that it is the policy of the state
that projects to be carried out by public agencies be subject to
the same level of review and consideration ... as that of pri-
57. See, e.q., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976)(Marshall, J., con-
curring and dissenting); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 965, 970 (5th Cir. 1983);
Isle of Hope Historical Ass'n, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 646 F.2d
215, 220 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
58. Robinson, SEQRA's Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA's in the Sister
States, 46 Albany L. Rev. 1155 (1982).
59. Id. at 1157. States with environmental quality review acts include: California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In addi-
tion, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico has enacted such a law.
60. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Act is
ably discussed, along with the decisions interpreting it, in Selmi, The Judicial Devel-
opment of the California Environmental Quality Act, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 197
(1984).
1987]
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vate projects required to be reviewed by public agencies." '
This amendment stemmed from concern expressed to the leg-
islature by developers that private projects were given more
exacting scrutiny than public agency projects.2
The California legislature also riddled the Act with a se-
ries of exceptions. It now no longer applies, inter alia, to long-
range coastal development plans by localities,63 grade crossing
eliminations,64 or public school closings.6 5 This regressive pol-
icy of excepting entire areas of government action from envi-
ronmental review has, to the credit of our legislature, not been
adopted in New York.
New Jersey, enlarging rather than hacking away at its en-
vironmental review statutes, now requires both economic and
environmental impact statements prior to the adoption of cer-
tain bills by the legislature. At the request of a majority of the
committee considering a bill, the Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection is to prepare an EIS as to that bill within
ninety days.6 A parallel provision authorizes economic impact
statements by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry at a
committee's request. 7 No comparable procedure exists in
New York, where SEQRAa8 is limited to "actions" by state
and local agencies of the executive branch and by local gov-
erning bodies. The New York statute applies to local, but not
state, legislative actions.69
61. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001.1 (1986).
62. Conversation with Prof. Daniel P. Selmi, Loyola Law School (Oct. 30, 1985).
Prof. Selmi headed the California State Bar Association Environmental Section task
force which helped draft the 1984 Amendments to the Act.
63. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080.9 (1986)(as amended 1984). The Act does, how-
ever, expressly apply to such plans devised by the State Coastal Commission. Id.
64. Id. § 21080.13.
65. Id. § 21080.18. In addition, a 1986 amendment exempts municipal waste in-
cinerators burning exclusively wood waste, animal waste, or certain other substances
from the need to prepare an environmental impact statement. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
21151.1 (Supp. 1988).
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:13f-4 (West 1986).
67. Id. § 52:13f-3.
68. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
69. Id. § 8-0105(1)-(5). Note that, as stated in the text, legislative actions of lo-
calities are subject to the Act. See Niagara Recycling, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Niagara, 83
A.D.2d 335, 443 N.Y.S.2d 951 (4th Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 859, 438 N.E.2d 1142,
[Vol. 5
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Washington, a state whose act, like California's, antedates
New York's, amended it to exclude consolidations of cities or
towns and annexations by cities or towns of all of another city
or town.70 This step backwards was designed to reduce the im-
pact of City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review
Board,71 a landmark decision holding the annexation of a par-
cel of largely vacant land by a municipality to require envi-
ronmental review under the Act.
A Washington decision also held that condemnation of
land does not trigger the state's Environmental Policy Act.72
In re Port of Grays Harbor73 followed a state regulation and
exempted the condemnation of land by a port agency from
the Act, though it held that the amendment of the agency's
comprehensive development plan, of which the land acquisi-
tion was a step, did fall within the statute.7' This grudging
decision restricting environmental quality review - probably,
in fairness to the court, mandated by the apposite state regu-
lation - is in contrast to New York where land acquisition by
government is plainly within SEQRA.75
B. Environmental Impact Statement Procedure
Several recent decisions, as well as an amendment to Cal-
ifornia's statute, have shed light on whether an EIS is needed,
its contents, and the public notice required.
A 1983 California decision holds that an agency's failure
to act, even if the action not taken would significantly affect
453 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1982); Tri-County Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Town Bd., 55 N.Y.2d
41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982).
70. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.21c.225, (Supp. 1988) added by 1985 Wash. Laws
ch. 281, § 29.
71. 90 Wash. 2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978). See also Spokane County Fire Protec-
tion Dist. No. 8 v. Spokane County Boundary Review Bd., 27 Wash. App. 491, 618
P.2d 1326 (1980), to the same effect.
72. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 43.21c.010-.914 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
73. 30 Wash. App. 855, 638 P.2d 633 (1982).
74. Id. at 865, 638 P.2d at 639.
75. See the Department of Environmental Conservation's regulations, N.Y.
Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.12(b)(4) (1978), explicitly providing that acquisi-
tion of one hundred or more acres by a state or local agency is a Type I action pre-
sumptively requiring an EIS.
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the environment, requires no EIS. In City of National City v.
State76 the state's Department of Transportation rescinded its
earlier decision to build a highway, for a portion of which it
had prepared an EIS. National City, through which part of
the road was to have been built, contended a supplemental
EIS was needed prior to rescission under the Act, which re-
quires such a supplement when "[slubstantial changes are
proposed in the project which will require major revisions.""
But the court held "it] he decision not to go forward would not
cause a significant change in the environment,"7 8 so that no
EIS was needed. (Both parties conceded that an EIS was re-
quired before selling the right-of-way the state had ac-
quired.)7 9
The court relied on State of Alaska v. Andrus,8" which
held that no EIS was required where the Secretary of the In-
terior decided not to bar a state from allowing a wolf hunt on
federal lands.8 1 But it ignored a closer precedent, National
Helium Corp. v. Morton.82 There an earlier Secretary of the
Interior determined to halt the agency's purchase of helium.
The court found that ending the purchases would soon de-
plete the nation's supply of helium, a by-product of natural
gas which, if not extracted, disappears into the air. It directed
the Secretary to prepare an EIS. Here, too, the agency did not
simply fail to act; it cancelled a previous commitment. The
failure to build the road will certainly affect traffic and influ-
ence land-use patterns. An EIS should have been directed.
California amended its Act in 1984 to state explicitly that
76. 140 Cal. App. 3d 598, 189 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1983).
77. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21166 (1986 & Supp. 1988). The California Act refers
to environmental impact reports in place of statements. This article follows the prac-
tice of the California courts themselves and uses the universally accepted terms
"statement" or "EIS."
78. City of Nat'l City, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 602, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
79. Id. at 605, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
80. 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. See, to the same effect, Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). Note that the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines define "Major
Federal action" to include "circumstance[s] where the responsible officials fail to act
and that failure to act is reviewable by courts." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1987).
82. 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
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public controversy over the effects of a project shall not in
itself mandate an EIS.83 This was done to overrule the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act Guidelines,8 and cases fol-
lowing them,85 holding that an EIS should be prepared where
there is substantial public controversy. This amendment
makes sense. Surely public controversy alone should not dic-
tate, or even strongly impel, the need for an EIS.8
The creation of a unified school district, allowing students
to attend a high school five to seven miles closer to home, was
held by the California courts to be a "project" within the
meaning of the Act.8 7 The court noted the plan would likely
result in building a new high school and changes in bus routes
and schedules and traffic flow. The State Board of Education
was ordered to prepare an environmental assessment to deter-
mine whether a full EIS would be needed.8 The court, analo-
gizing the plan to a conditional use permit or an annexation
proposal, held the project need not itself immediately affect
the environment so long as the actions thereunder may
culminate in environmental impact. This bolsters the parallel
view taken by New York's Court of Appeals in the Tri-County
83. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21082.2 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
84. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 15081 (1986).
85. See e.g., No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
86. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 838 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973), where the court construed the Council on Environmental Quality's
NEPA Guidelines which then stated that actions with "highly controversial" environ-
mental impact "should be covered" by the EIS requirement. (The current guidelines,
40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1986), state that "the degree to which the effects on the
quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial" is an element
the agency should consider.) In Hanly, the court found that "controversial" refers to
"cases where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature or effect of the major
federal action rather than to the existence of opposition." Hanty, 471 F.2d at 830. It
wisely noted that to find that "controversial" means engendering opposition "would
surrender the determination [whether to prepare an EIS] to opponents of a major
federal action, no matter how insignificant its environmental effect." Id. at 830 n.9a.
87. Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 32 Cal. 3d
779, 187 Cal. Rptr. 398, 654 P.2d 168 (1982).
88. Cf. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)
providing for environmental assessments. See, to similar effect, City of Carmel-by-
the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Cal. App. 3d 229, 227 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986).
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case, 89 holding a referendum as to the creation of a sewer dis-
trict to be an action triggering SEQRA.
Wisconsin, on the other hand, unrealistically narrowed its
statute by holding it inapplicable to the socioeconomic impact
stemming from a proposed shopping mall.90 Like many a large
suburban mall, the impact of this development on downtown
Appleton was predicted to be severe. But the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that the statute is limited to physical im-
pacts, and sustained an environmental assessment weighing
only the effects of the mall on streams, vegetation and the
like.
This view is unduly narrow. A major shopping mall will
likely drain traffic and business from downtown stores and of-
fices, eventually leading to new construction around the mall
and perhaps boarded-up stores on Main Street. As the courts
have consistently held, these are environmental impacts under
any realistic definition of that term, in light of the purposes of
environmental quality review laws. 1 This is especially true of
New York's statute, which expressly requires agencies to
weigh economic as well as environmental impacts.2
A broader view of the California act was taken in San
Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of
San Francisco9 s The court held the city's planning commis-
sion failed to consider adequately the cumulative impact of
four new high-rise office buildings. The EIS predicted that 6.3
to 8.8 million square feet of related satellite development
would be generated by the new buildings, although it con-
89. Supra note 69. But see Engle v. Pulver, 80 A.D.2d 598, 43 N.Y.S.2d 39 (2d
Dep't 1981)(closing a school not an "action" within SEQRA).
90. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 115
Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983)(construing Wis. Envtl. Policy Act of 1971, Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 1.11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987)).
91. See H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 418
N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep't 1979)(increased traffic from stadium); Jackson County v.
Jones, 571 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978)(proposed relocation and closure of Air Force
base).
92. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 1984).
93. 151 Cal. App. 3d 61, 198 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1984). See the discussion in Selmi,
The Judicial Development of the California Environmental Quality Act, 18 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 197, 243-45 (1984).
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ceded elsewhere that that number would likely rise to twelve
to eighteen million square feet. The court found the failure to
consider cumulative impact undermined the effectiveness and
validity of the entire EIS. This holding dovetails with the
holdings of New York courts that environmental impact re-
view requires literal compliance with the Act,94 consonant
with its salutary goals.
C. Alternatives and Mitigation Measures
Today, only a rotunda with a spectacular colored glass
ceiling dome remains of San Francisco's City of Paris depart-
ment store, incorporated into the modern Neiman-Marcus
building that replaced it. The demolition of this landmark led
to an important decision on the consideration of alternatives
and mitigation measures in an EIS.9 5 The statement prepared
by the city's Board of Permit Appeals concluded the historic
shop did not meet current seismic standards and lacked esca-
lators and a sprinkler system. Noting that rehabilitation
would be far more costly than the proposed new building, the
court held that saving the existing building was not a feasible
alternative. Nor was sale to another purchaser who planned to
save the building, since his offer was for one million dollars
less than Neiman-Marcus paid for the site. The court held
that preserving the rotunda and dome constituted "major mit-
igation of the significant historic, visual, and urban design im-
pacts of the Project. ' 96 Although California's Act, like New
York's, contains a substantive mandate to mitigate adverse
environmental impacts,97 the court found ample support in
94. See Rye Town/King Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d
67 (2d Dep't 1981); Schenectady Chemicals, Inc. v. Flacke, 83 A.D.2d 460, 446
N.Y.S.2d 418 (3d Dep't 1981). See also Stevens v. City of Glendale, 125 Cal. App. 3d
986, 178 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1981)(overturning an EIS as to a city's general plan for fail-
ure to furnish adequate public notice).
95. Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City & County of
San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1980).
96. Id. at 912, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
97. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21002, 21002.1 (1986 & Supp. 1988). Cf. N.Y. Envtl.
Conserv. Law §§ 8-0103(9), 8-0109(2)(f) (McKinney 1984); Town of Henrietta v. De-
partment of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 222, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (4th
Dep't 1980).
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the record for the board's decision to reject rehabilitation and
allow destruction of the historic structure. Certainly a major
element in this decision was the earlier refusal of the city to
confer landmark status on the building. Landmark status
would have shielded it, unless the owner could show an inabil-
ity to earn a reasonable return."
In contrast, a more recent California decision set aside an
EIS for failure to adequately consider alternatives to a pro-
posed cemetery requiring county approval of its site.99 The
site contained endangered plant species and a bald eagle
habitat, which were both discussed in the EIS. But the state-
ment's discussion of alternatives was limited to the assertion
that "[d]evelopment of this project at another location within
the Big Bear area may result in similar adverse impacts."100 In
fact, the court found that other less environmentally damag-
ing sites were available and had been discussed at the
agency's hearings, though not in the EIS.101 The court rejected
the statement and remanded the case for preparation of an
adequate EIS.10 2
D. Judicial Review
California has amended its Act to provide specifically for
settlement meetings in proceedings to challenge or review
agency actions involving environmental quality review.'0 3Within twenty days after service of a petition or complaint on
98. Architectural Heritage, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 916-17, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 413. Cf.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This decision has
been widely criticized along the lines suggested here. See Comment, Substantive En-
forcement of the California Environmental Quality Act, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 112, 129-
131 (1981): "The City of Paris case ... illustrates the danger that courts employing
the substantial evidence test will fail to review the agency's exercise of discretion in
choosing goals, even though the Act limits the agency's discretion." Id. at 130. A re-
cent California case held a demolition permit for an historic building could not issue
until completion of the entire environmental review procedure under the act. Orinda
Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1145, 227 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1986).
99. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino,
155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1984).
100. Id. at 751, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
101. Id. at 752-53, 202 Cal. Rptr. 429-30.
102. Id.
103. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21167.8 (1986).
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a public agency, the agency must notify the parties of a settle-
ment conference to be held within forty-five days following
service of the petition or complaint. The petitioner has the
burden of serving a presettlement statement on all parties,
summarizing the case and its issues. The statute requires the
parties to "meet and attempt in good faith to settle the litiga-
tion and the dispute which forms the basis of the litigation,"
and to prepare and sign a settlement agreement describing is-
sues settled and those left unresolved."' The court or any
party may then schedule a settlement conference before a
judge other than the judge who will hear the case.1"' Failure of
any party to participate without good cause may result in
sanctions; failure of the petitioner to do so "shall result in dis-
missal with prejudice.' 0 It will be interesting to see how ef-
fectively this 1984 addition to the Act reduces or speeds litiga-
tion, and whether other states will follow California's rather
draconian approach.
Finally, two recent cases deal with the perennially net-
tlesome issue of standing to review agency action. New York's
SEQRA, like its federal counterpart, nowhere expressly pro-
vides for judicial review. Like NEPA, however, it has been
vigorously enforced by the courts. But several decisions have
limited standing to challenge agency actions under SEQRA to
those asserting an environmental, as opposed to economic, in-
jury.'1 7 The federal courts, in contrast, impose no such limita-
tion on those challenging actions under NEPA. °' a
This restriction on standing is an arbitrary one which the
New York Court of Appeals should reject. Yet the courts in
Washington and Wisconsin have adopted a similar view, and
dismissed suits by persons asserting economic injury. In Con-
104. Id. §§ 21167.8(c), (e).
105. Id. § 21167.8(f).
106. Id. § 21167.8(g).
107. See County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S.2d 110 (3d
Dep't 1979); New York State Builders Ass'n v. State, 98 Misc. 2d 1045, 414 N.Y.S.2d
956 (1979). These decisions stand in sharp contrast to the liberal view of standing
adopted by the court of appeals in land use cases such as Douglaston Civic Ass'n v.
Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974).
108. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Shif-
fler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1977).
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cerned Olympia Residents for the Environment v. City of
Olympia,1°9 a property owner and an environmental group
sued to enjoin construction of a new hospital wing for, inter
alia, non-compliance with the Washington act. The individual
petitioner claimed the proposed hospital expansion would det-
rimentally affect his nearby property, and cause him "injury
in fact, both economic and physical." 110 In addition, he alleged
imminent financial loss on another parcel that he owned
across town. A different hospital had placed an option on this
second parcel which, he asserted, it would not exercise were
the first project to go ahead."'
The court, after giving "short shrift" to the financial loss
as to the optioned parcel, ruled that the petitioner's initial
claim failed to "set forth any evidentiary facts to prove that
he will sustain an 'injury in fact.' "1 Although the petitioner
had alleged a variety of environmental impacts to a nearby
creek and peat bog, changes in drainage, traffic, and the like,
the court noted that there was no showing that any of these
would impact on his property.
Finally, the court concluded that the environmental
group "has no more standing than that provided by one of its
members," since "[t]here is no attempt here to assert [the
group's] standing other than that provided through [the indi-
vidual petitioner]. 11 3 The group had evidently failed to as-
sert, or was unable to assert, the kind of specific injury in fact
sufficient to support standing under Sierra Club v. Morton.11 4
No one, it seemed, had standing to litigate the asserted failure
to comply with the statute. While the petitioners should have
shown injury more adroitly, or enlisted additional allies with
property impacted by the project, the court's view seems an
atavistic return to discredited hypertechnical rules of
standing.
A Wisconsin case likewise found a disparate group of pe-
109. 33 Wash. App. 677, 657 P.2d 790 (1983).
110. Id. at 681, 657 P.2d at 792.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 683, 657 P.2d at 794.
113. Id. at 684, 657 P.2d at 794.
114. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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titioners to share one trait: all lacked standing to review an
assertedly inadequate EIS." 5 Here, however, the court's rea-
soning and justification seem far more persuasive than in
Olympia. The court held neither a district attorney nor the
relatives of prisoners had standing to challenge the EIS pre-
pared prior to building a new maximum-security prison in
Portage, about one hundred miles from Milwaukee. " 6
The Milwaukee County District Attorney argued that
placing a prison in Portage would make family visits difficult
for inmates from Milwaukee County. Since half the state's in-
mates were from Milwaukee County, this would, he con-
tended, add to recidivism as well as disintegration of families,
and therefore would increase welfare costs in Milwaukee. The
court found these claims to be too remote to constitute injury
in fact. The similar contentions of the prisoners' relatives
were equally unavailing. The court observed:
They do not and in fact cannot allege that any of their
relatives will actually be incarcerated in the prison in
Portage. [In any event] the effect on Fox, et al.'s family
lives of having their relatives incarcerated in Portage ver-
sus another facility ... is at best speculative and uncer-
tain.... Further, the kind of injury which appears to be
claimed here - disruption of the prisoner's relatives'
family lives - does not have a close causal relationship to
a change in the physical environment in Portage. " '
Although a Portage environmental group and residents
adjacent to the proposed prison intervened, each of whom
would have had standing had they been petitioners, the court
held them time-barred. The court noted that "the subject
matter jurisdiction of the trial court never properly attached
to the original petitioners""' 8 so that there was no pending
suit, and "intervention will not be permitted to breathe life
115. Fox v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 112 Wis. 2d 514, 334
N.W.2d 532 (1983).
116. Id. at 527-28, 334 N.W.2d at 541.
117. Id. at 533, 334 N.W.2d at 541.
118. Id. at 537-38, 334 N.W.2d at 543.
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into a 'non-existent' lawsuit." 1 9 While this decision is more
defensible than Olympia,20 both represent a retrogressive
narrowing of standing rules and point in the opposite direc-
tion from that laudably taken by the federal courts.
III. Conclusion
New York stands in the forefront of states vigorously im-
plementing their environmental quality review statutes. Our
courts have steadfastly construed SEQRA to impose substan-
tive requirements on state and local government agencies, 21
and have not hesitated to enjoin major projects for non-
compliance. 22
Experience in other states and with NEPA has shown the
prodigious importance of environmental quality review in in-
sisting that government stop, look, and listen prior to embark-
ing on irreversible projects. Beneath the visible litigated cases
are thousands of uncelebrated administrative decisions to re-
ject, or mitigate the impact of, proposals which would other-
wise have harmed the natural resources all of us must share.
New York's courts and agencies should continue to set their
course at full speed toward the goal of SEQRA - to insure
that government agencies weigh the consequences of the ac-
tions they perform, fund, or license, and to avoid environmen-
tal impacts which will cause lasting damage.
Perhaps the implications of insuring consideration of en-
vironmental values transcend the conservation of resources
and preservation of scenic beauty. Long before environmental
119. Id. at 536, 334 N.W.2d at 543 (citing Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir.
1965)). See also Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 115 Wis. 2d 381, 406-07, 340 N.W.2d 722, 735 (1983)(upholding the denial of
standing at the administrative level under a statute); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 227.064(1)(c)
(West 1982)(requiring injury different in kind or degree from that suffered by the
general public, in order to contest a decision not to prepare an EIS). The Wisconsin
statute was renumbered from § 227.064 to § 227.42 by 1985 Wis. Legis. Serv. 182, § 28
(West).
120. Supra note 109.
121. See e.g., Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76
A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980).
122. See Tri-County Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Town Bd. 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432
N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982).
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concerns were the subject of statutes and frequent court deci-
sions, George Orwell perceptively wrote:
By retaining one's childhood love of such things as trees
. . . one makes a peaceful and decent future a little more
probable, and by preaching the doctrine that nothing is to
be admired except steel and concrete, one merely makes
it a little surer that human beings will have no outlet for
their surplus energy except in hatred and
leaderworship.1 23
In their way, NEPA, and SEQRA and its companion laws,
when taken seriously by administrators and the courts, help
steer us toward the goal Orwell sought.
123. B. Crick, George Orwell: A Life, 303-04 (1982).
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